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Abstract
I analyze the e®ects of a merger between two ¯rms in a spatially di®erentiated
oligopoly. I make the crucial assumption that the industry is at a free-entry equilibrium
both before and after the merger. In particular, I allow for the possibility of entry
subsequent to the merger. Not surprisingly, this possibility improves the e®ect of
the merger on consumer welfare. More importantly, I show that post-merger entry
dramatically shifts the perspective on cost e±ciencies as a merger defense and asset
sales as a remedy. Cost e±ciencies (in the form of lower marginal cost) decrease
the likelihood of entry, and thus bene¯t consumers less than if entry conditions were
exogenously given. Likewise, by selling assets (stores) to potential rivals, merging ¯rms
e®ectively \buy them o®," that is, dissuade them from opening new stores, an e®ect
that is detrimental to consumers.
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1 Introduction
On September 1996, Staples and O±ce Depot, the two largest o±ce supplies superstores
(OSS) in the U.S., announced their agreement to merge. The Federal Trade Commission
voted 4-1 to oppose the merger on the grounds that it would likely lead to substantially
higher prices. In fact, an econometric study commissioned by the FTC showed that prices
are higher in markets where only one ¯rm operates than in markets with two- or three-way
competition. Addressing the FTC's concerns, Staples / O±ce Depot o®ered to sell a series
of stores to rival O±ce Max, but the FTC maintained its opposition to the merger.
Although the FTC's action was challenged by the merging parties, the Courts eventually
ruled in favor of the FTC. Judge Hogan, who decided the case, dismissed the defendants'
argument that cost e±ciencies would be signi¯cant and passed on to consumers. Moreover,
entry was considered irrelevant as the cost of setting up a new OSS chain \would be extremely
high."1 Surprisingly, little importance was given to the issue of the impact of the merger
on O±ce Max's expansion rate, even though the parties seemed to agree that the cost of
opening a new store is reasonably low and certain. The defendants did argue that O±ce
Max's growth in 1997 demonstrates the ease of expansion by existing leaders. However,
Staples and O±ce Depot failed to show how the rate of expansion relates to the event of the
merger.
The 1992 U.S. Merger Guidelines accept that, \in markets where entry is . . . easy, . . . the
merger raises no antitrust concern and ordinarily requires no further analysis" (point 3.0).
However, entry conditions have been given little weight in actual merger policy: It is di±cult
to identify potential entrants and the height of entry barriers, whereas other indicators |
such as market shares and concentration indices | are more readily obtained.2 By contrast,
cost e±ciencies are a frequent argument in favor of mergers; and asset sales, such as the one
proposed by Staples/O±ce Depot are frequently o®ered or requested as a partial remedy for
the adverse e®ects of the merger.
Notwithstanding the general di±culties in taking entry into account in merger analysis,
there are cases where both the set of potential entrants and the costs of entry seem easy
to determine. Consider again the OSS industry. Although the costs of creating a new ¯rm
would be very high, it would certainly be possible for the non-merging party (O±ce Max)
to expand into markets dominated by the would-be Staples/Depot alliance.
In this paper, I analyze the impact of a merger between two multi-location (or multi-
product) ¯rms, taking into account the possibility of entry by rival ¯rms, that is, the possibil-
ity that rival ¯rms will open new locations (or create new products) as a result of the merger.
1
FTC v. Staples and O±ce Depot, Judge T. Hogan's Redacted Memorandum Opinion, June 30, 1997.
2
White (1987) argues that, in this sense,
the [DOJ] Guidelines might justly be accused of reversing the order of importance of and
quantitative attention paid to [entry conditions, thus being] likened to the drunk who, though
he thinks he probably lost his keys in the middle of the road, spends most of his time looking
for them on the sidewalk \because the light is better there."
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Speci¯cally, I assume that the industry is at a \free-entry" equilibrium both before and after
the merger takes place, where \free-entry" refers to the creation of new locations/products.
Not surprisingly, the analysis reveals that the possibility of entry improves the e®ect of
the merger on consumer welfare. For parameter values that roughly calibrate the Staples
/ O±ce Depot case, I show that the price increase resulting form the merger is one to two
thirds lower than what it would be were entry never to take place.3
More importantly, I show that post-merger entry dramatically shifts the perspective on
cost e±ciencies as a merger defense and asset sales as a remedy. The e±ciencies defense is
that mergers imply a decrease in marginal cost, part of which is passed on to consumers in the
form of lower prices. But a more e±cient merged ¯rm also implies that entry is less likely, as
potential entrants would be facing tougher price competition. The bene¯t consumers receive
from cost e±ciencies is therefore lower than if entry conditions were exogenous.
A similar phenomenon occurs with respect to asset sales. Asset sales are frequently
sought as a remedy for the increased market power resulting from a merger. I show that
asset sales and post-merger entry are \substitutes." By selling stores to potential rivals,
merging ¯rms e®ectively buy them o®, that is, dissuade them from opening new stores.4
This is good for the merging ¯rms but bad for consumers: the latter prefer an asymmetric
duopoly with more stores (no asset sales and entry by the rival ¯rm) to a symmetric duopoly
with fewer stores (asset sales).
Previous literature has explicitly considered the equilibrium adjustment following a merger
(Farrell and Shapiro, 1990). However, entry is typically not taken into account in this re-
search. An exception is given by Werden and Froeb (1998), who nevertheless do not address
the issues of cost e±ciencies and asset sales.
The paper is structured is follows. In the next section, I present the model and the
main results. In Section 3, I calibrate the model with data from the Staples case. Section 4
concludes the paper.
2 Model and results
Consider an industry where three ¯rms own a series of stores each and compete in a given
set of markets. Initially, the industry is at a free-entry equilibrium, in the sense that no ¯rm
would wish to open an additional store in any of the markets. Suppose now that Firms 1
and 2 merge, turning the industry into a duopoly. What will the new free-entry equilibrium
3
In a recent, related paper, Werden and Froeb (1998) argue that \when sunk costs associated with entry
are at levels suggested by prevailing market structure, the opportunity for entry created by an anticompetitive
merger plausibly is too small to induce entry, even absent Stiglerian `barriers to entry.' " My conclusions
di®er from theirs. One important di®erence between our models is that Werden and Froeb use a logit model
of product di®erentiation (with little or no neighborhood e®ects), whereas I use a Salop-type model (with
strong neighborhood e®ects). More on this in Section 4.
4
There is an interesting contrast between this situation and Rasmusen's (1988) model of entry for buyout.
In the latter, the possibility of asset acquisitions by the incumbent induces entry. In the former, the possibility
of asset sales by the incumbent prevents entry.
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Figure 1: Timing of the model.
look like?5
Echoing the concerns of several recent merger cases, my particular focus is on markets that
initially comprise only Firm 1 and Firm 2 stores, so that, absent additional adjustments, the
merger would lead to a local monopoly. Speci¯cally, I consider the case when the merging
¯rms own one store each in the initial free-entry equilibrium. What is the impact of the
merger in such a market?
Absent any additional entry, we would go from a duopoly of one-store ¯rms to a monopoly
with two stores. The merger would naturally imply higher prices, to the detriment of con-
sumers. However, less aggressive behavior by the newly-formed Firm 1&2 is likely to induce
entry by Firm 3, which implies an increase in consumer welfare, both in terms of lower prices
and greater product variety. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the importance of this
e®ect on expected consumer welfare.
I assume each market is characterized by the Salop model of product di®erentiation.
There exists a population of s consumers uniformly distributed along a circle of unit length.
Firms have stores located along the circle. Each consumer is willing to pay up to v for one
unit of the ¯rms' product and chooses the ¯rm o®ering the lowest total cost, where total
cost is given by price plus transportation cost. The latter is equal to t = d2, where d is
the distance between the consumer's and the ¯rm's locations.6 If total cost is greater than
valuation, then the consumer makes no purchase. Firms must incur a sunk cost of k per
location and a constant marginal cost of production c.
I assume the value of v is such that, when there is competition, the entire market is
covered. It can be shown that this amounts to
Assumption 1 v > c+ 5
16
t.
For a given set of parameter values, there typically exist multiple initial free-entry equi-
libria. I consider the equilibrium that would result from the following sequential entry game:
at stage 1, Firm 1 decides whether to open a store and where to locate it. At stage 2, Firm
2 does the same; then Firm 3; then Firm 1 has the option of opening a second store; and so
forth. In the case when only Firms 1 and 2 open one store, the equilibrium con¯guration is
for Firm 1 to open a store at zero and Firm 2 at 1=
2
.7 I assume that the values of k; c; v; d
5
Although there is free entry in terms of store openings by the incumbent ¯rms, I assume the barriers to
entry by a new ¯rm are very high. That is, all entry is accounted for by stores opened by one of the three
incumbent ¯rms.
6
The original Salop (1979) paper considered linear transportation costs. Following d'Aspremont et al.
(1979), I assume quadratic transportation costs, which simpli¯es the problem of equilibrium existence (equi-
librium in pure strategies does not always exist with linear transportation costs).
7
This is equilibrium is unique up to a rotation along the circle.
3
Table 1: Critical values of market size.
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are such that this is the initial equilibrium and address the question of the impact of the
merger between Firms 1 and 2.
Following the merger between Firms 1 and 2, there will typically exist multiple free-entry
equilibria. I will assume that the new equilibrium results from entry by Firm 3 only. This
assumption seems consistent with the observation that merging ¯rms spend more resources
restructuring than expanding. It also pins down a unique post-merger equilibrium.
The assumption that we start from a free-entry equilibrium with only Firms 1 and 2
implies particular parameter values, speci¯cally particular values of market size given k; c
and v. Likewise, which new equilibrium takes place following the merger of Firms 1 and
2 depends on the values of k; c; v and s. Table 1 depicts the critical values of s for each
equilibrium con¯guration. The middle column shows the critical value of equilibrium pro¯ts
for the \marginal ¯rm" according to each equilibrium con¯guration. For example, in the
¯rst row we have ¼
1
= 4
9
q
3(v¡c)
3
t
s ¡ k. This is the pro¯t that a monopolist with one store
would earn. Equating to zero and solving with respect to s we get the critical value s
0
shown
on the third column. We conclude that, if s < s
0
, then no ¯rm will enter in equilibrium.
Suppose now that there are two ¯rms in the market, each with one store. Store locations
are l
1
= 0 and l
2
= 1=
2
, as indicated in the second row of Table 1 (¯rst column). Equilibrium
pro¯ts per ¯rm are given by ¼
2
= 1
8
s t ¡ k (second column). Equating to zero and solving
with respect to s, we get s
1
= 8 k
t
(third column). We conclude that, if s
0
< s < s
1
, the
initial equilibrium is one store only, whereas s > s
1
implies two or more stores.
Would a third ¯rm want to enter in the initial situation? In order to address this question,
we compute Firm 3's equilibrium pro¯ts if it were to open a store at l
3
= 1=
4
(the best location
possible). This is given in the third row of Table 1 (second column): ¼
3
= 3
10
s t¡k. Equating
to zero and solving for s we get s = s
3
= 4096
121
k
t
. It follows that, if s
1
< s < s
3
, the initial
equilibrium consists of a duopoly of one-store ¯rms.
Suppose that this is the case (s
1
< s < s
3
) and that Firms 1 and 2 merge. What is
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Table 2: Pre- and post-merger equilibrium.
Equilibrium prices Av. price Tr'n cost ¡ Cons. welf.
Pre-merger
(s
1
< s
3
)
p
1
= p
2
= c+ 1
4
t c+ 1
4
t 1
48
t c+ 13
48
t
Post-merger, no entry
(s
1
< s
2
)
p
1
= p
2
= v ¡ 1
16
t v ¡ 1
16
t 1
48
t v ¡ 2
48
t
Post-merger, entry
(s
2
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3
)
p
1
= p
2
= c + 7
48
t
p
3
= c+ 5
48
t
c+ 148
1152
t 19
1152
t c+ 167
1152
t
the new free entry equilibrium? Given that Firm 1&2 will now price less aggressively, it is
possible that Firm 3 want to enter when it didn't before.8 In order to answer this question, we
compute Firm 3's equilibrium pro¯ts when it competes against a two-store Firm 1&2. This
is done in the fourth row of Table 1. Firm 3's equilibrium pro¯ts are given by ¼
3
= 121
4096
s t¡k
(second column). Equating to zero, we get s = s
2
= 576
25
k
t
. If follows that, if s > s
2
, then
the merger between Firms 1 and 2 induces the entry of Firm 3.
From a consumer welfare point of view, it makes a big di®erence whether s is greater or
less than s
2
. In cities of relatively smaller size, the e®ect of the merger is simply to increase
prices; the number of stores and their locations remain the same. In cities of relatively larger
size, however, the merger brings in new competition. Consumers then bene¯t from greater
price competition as well as a greater number of stores (lower transportation costs). This is
con¯rmed in Table 2, which displays the average equilibrium price, transportation cost, and
total cost (the negative of consumer welfare) in the three cases considered above: pre-merger,
post-merger with no entry, and post merger with entry. Notice that 13
48
¼ :271 > 167
1152
¼ :145.
Moreover, 1
4
> 148
1152
¼ :129. Finally, Assumption 1 implies that v ¡ 2
48
t > c + 13
48
t. We
conclude that
Proposition 1 If s
1
< s < s
2
, then a merger between Firm 1 and Firm 2 leads to no
additional entry; prices increase and consumer welfare decreases. If s
2
< s < s
3
, then a
merger between Firm 1 and Firm 2 leads to entry by Firm 3; average price and average
transportation costs decrease, and so consumer welfare increases.
Cost savings. To a greater or lesser extent, cost e±ciencies are commonly invoked as
a merger defense. For example, in preparation for the Exxon-Mobil merger, it is reported
that \the companies are working to show cost savings that will result from the merger" (The
Wall Street Journal Europe, January 20, 1999). Cost savings also played an important role
8
I assume that it is not possible for the merged ¯rm to commit to price competitively.
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in Staples' defense of its proposed merger with O±ce Depot. The general argument is that,
because of increased e±ciency, consumers bene¯t from a merger insofar as cost savings are
passed on to buyers in the form of lower prices. This is particularly the case when savings
are in terms of marginal cost. When entry is endogenous, however, we must also take into
account the indirect e®ect of the merger. And this may reduce (or even reverse) the e®ect
of cost e±ciencies on consumer welfare.
What is the e®ect of cost e±ciencies on consumer welfare? From Table 2, we see that,
when the merger results in a monopoly, price is a function of v but not of c; that is, no cost
savings are passed on to consumers. In case of duopoly, however, prices are a function of
c and cost savings translate into lower prices and greater consumer welfare. Finally, cost
savings by the merged Firm 1&2 have another important e®ect: Firm 3's equilibrium pro¯t
in case it enters the market is lower. This implies that the threshold market size s
2
is greater
the greater the cost e±ciencies. We thus have two opposing e®ects of cost e±ciencies on
consumer welfare. On the one hand, equilibrium prices are lower (in case of duopoly); on the
other hand, the probability of entry is lower: for some values of s, entry will not take place
if there are cost e±ciencies whereas it would otherwise. That is, the greater cost e±ciencies
may have a negative e®ect on expected consumer welfare, where \expected" means \over a
distribution of values of s."
If the value of v is very high, then the di®erence in consumer welfare between post-
merger monopoly and duopoly is also very high. The negative e®ect of cost e±ciencies then
dominates the positive e®ect, to the point that expected post-merger consumer welfare is
decreasing in the extent of the merger's cost e±ciencies:
Proposition 2 The greater the merger's cost savings, the lower the probability of post-
merger entry. If v is high enough, then the greater the merger's cost savings the lower
the expected post-merger consumer welfare.
Asset sales. Merger authorities often demand that would-be merging ¯rms divest from
some of their assets as a condition for approving the merger. Sometimes, the merging ¯rms
themselves take the initiative of including asset sales as part of their merger proposal. For
example, Exxon and Mobil have a high combined market share in several Northeastern U.S.
metropolitan areas (e.g., 24% of the stations in Northern New Jersey). It is reported that the
companies \may be forced to sell or sever contracts for more than 1,000 gas stations . . . as
a condition for U.S. approval of their $75 billion merger" (The Wall Street Journal Europe,
January 20, 1999). Another example from the same industry is given by the merger between
BP and Amoco, who \are expected to divest themselves of more than a hundred gasoline
stations and sever ties with several hundred more in at least half a dozen U.S. states to gain
U.S. Federal Trade Commission approval for their merger" (The Wall Street Journal Europe,
December 30, 1998). Similar examples may be found in the European Union. In 1992, the
European Commission allowed the takeover of Perrier by Nestl¶e once the latter committed to
selling various of its well known brands, including Vichy, Thonon, Pierval and Saint Yorre (cf
6
Free-entry
equilibrium
(Firms 1, 2 and 3)
¡!
Firms 1 and 2
merge and o®er
to sell one store
to Firm 3
for price q
¡!
Firm 3
accepts/declines
o®er and/or
opens store
¡!
Free-entry
equilibrium
(Firms 1&2 and 3)
Figure 2: Timing of the model with asset sales.
Compte et al., 1997). More recently, the Commission signaled \a negative recommendation
. . . on the proposed deal [of MCI's takeover by WorldCom Inc.], . . . stepping up the pressure
for the companies to agree . . . to divest more of their Internet holdings" (The Wall Street
Journal Europe, July 1998).
In order to address the issue of asset sales, I now augment the previous model by assuming
that, together with the merger, the merging ¯rms o®er to sell one of their stores to the non-
merging ¯rm. I assume that Firm 1&2 make a take-it-or-leave-it o®er to Firm 3. After the
merger takes place and asset sales are completed, Firm 3 decides, as before, whether it wants
to open new stores, and competition takes place.
The purpose of asset sales, it would seem, is to create a more even distribution of assets
between the merged ¯rm and is rival, thus assuring a greater degree of competition and
consumer welfare. Speci¯cally, suppose that in the initial equilibrium Firm 1 and Firm 2
own one store each. If the ¯rms merge and there is no entry, then we have a monopoly with
two stores; whereas, if Firm 1&2 sells one of its stores to Firm 3, then duopoly competition
is maintained. Asset sales thus increase welfare. My main result is that the comparison is
reversed once entry is taken into consideration
Suppose that s
1
< s < s
2
. Absent asset sales, no entry will take place following the
merger between Firms 1 and 2. Selling one store to Firm 3 implies a duopoly with Firms
1&2 and 3, whereas no sale implies a monopolist Firm 1&2 with two stores. Clearly, total
pro¯ts are greater in the latter case, so there are no gains from trade and accordingly no
asset sale will take place. Suppose, however, that s
2
< s < s
3
. Absent asset sales, Firm
3 will enter with a store at l
3
= 1=
3
. Selling one store to Firm 3 implies a duopoly with
Firms 1&2 and 3 and locations l
1&2
and l
3
. In particular, Firm 3 would not want to open an
additional store: if, in the initial equilibrium, one of the incumbents did not want to open
a second store, neither does Firm 3 now. Clearly, total pro¯ts are greater in the case of a
duopoly with two stores only, so there are gains from trade and accordingly Firm 1&2 will
sell one store to Firm 3. Finally, notice that consumer welfare is greater with three stores
than with two. It thus follows that
Proposition 3 Consumer welfare is lower when asset sales are allowed.
It is important to note that this result refers to voluntary asset sales. If the regulatory
agency were to force Firm 1&2 to sell one store when s
1
< s < s
2
, then asset sales would
increase consumer welfare.
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3 Calibration
Following Proposition 1, the natural questions to ask are: how large is the price increase
from a merger when no entry takes place? How large is the price decrease from a merger
that induces entry? How likely is it that entry takes place following a merger? To answer
these questions, I now proceed to calibrate the model based on data related to the proposed
Staples / O±ce Depot merger. The Salop model presented above includes four parameters:
v; t; c and k. Moreover, in order to address the issue of the likelihood of post-merger entry,
we need to know the distribution of market size, f(s), and from this derive the relative
probability that s
1
< s < s
2
versus s
2
< s < s
3
.
The ¯rst thing to notice when calibrating the model is that we can normalize units with
no loss of generality. In fact, all of the values considered are proportional with respect to
the money unit of account. Accordingly, I normalize units so that t = 1.
In its case against the merger, the FTC commissioned a study on the relation between
concentration and prices. This study estimates that prices are about 10% higher in monopoly
markets than in duopoly markets;9 and about 4% higher in duopoly markets than in tri-
opoly markets.10 We thus have two constraints on parameter values. Together with the
normalization t = 1, this leaves us with one parameter, k, and the distribution of market
size.
Regarding the distribution of market size, there are two possible strategies to follow.
One is to take the \minimum information" approach and assume that, in the relevant range,
the density of market size is constant. This is a very rough approximation, since it is well
known that the density of demographic variables is typically decreasing. The advantage of
this approach is that we do not need to calibrate k, as the relevant results are independent
of its value.
The alternative strategy is to make the assumption that each city is a market and combine
census data (city population) with company data (cities where stores are located).11 Ac-
cordingly, from the U.S. Census Bureau data (http://www.census.gov) I estimated a Pareto
distribution of city size which seems to ¯t well the observed frequencies. The generic Pareto
distribution is given by f(s) = µ
s
0
³
s
0
s
´
(1+µ)
. The parameter values I chose are: s
0
= 10; 000
and µ = :84 (see Figure 3).12 Second, I calibrated the value of k based on the constraint
given by the frequency ratio between cities with one store and cities with two stores. From
9
The precise estimates are 11.6% when Staples is monopolist, 8.6% when O±ce Depot is monopolist.
These are di®erences with respect to Staples / Depot duopoly markets. See Dalkir and Warren-Boulton
(1998).
10
The exact estimates are 4.6% for a Staples / O±ce Max duopoly vs. a triopoly; and 2.5% for the case
of an O±ce Depot / O±ce Max duopoly. A di®erent study, by Prudential Securities, estimates that prices
in Totowa, N.J., a triopoly market, are on average 5.8% lower than in Paramus, N.J., a market served by
Staples and O±ce Max only. See Dalkir and Warren-Boulton (1998).
11
I am grateful to Serdar Dalkir from providing an Excel ¯le with the store location data, which in turn
was obtained from the companies websites. I consolidated the data to get the number of stores in each city
where at least one ¯rm is located.
12
The value 10,000 is the lower limit of the Pareto. It is also the lower limit of the sample of city sizes.
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Figure 3: US city population (cities and towns with population 10K+): observed frequency
and functional form approximation (f(s) = µ
s
0
³
s
0
s
´
(1+µ)
times 2578, the total number of
cities/towns with population 10K+, times 5000, the frequency class size; µ = 1; s
0
= 10000).
Rightmost frequency bar corresponds to 150K+. Source: U.S. Census Bureau and author's
calculations.
Table 3: Calibration results.
Concept value (%)
1. Total cost increase without entry 16.5
2. Average cost increase uniform 5.3
3. Pareto 10.8
4. Entry probability (city) uniform 41.8
5. Pareto 16.2
6. Entry probability (consumer) uniform 56.9
7. Pareto 29.0
the company data on store locations, I calculated this value to be 548=99.13
To summarize, I use three data-based constrains and one normalization to obtain the
four model parameters. The resulting values are t = 1; c ¼ 3:62; v ¼ 4:57; k ¼ 8265. I now
turn to the interpretation of these results.
Results. The relevant results in terms of probability of entry and consumer welfare
are presented in Table 3. Row 1 gives the increase in total consumer cost (price plus trans-
portation cost) in case there is a merger and no entry.14 Rows 2{3 give the average increase
13
A third strategy to estimating the density of s would be to use the market de¯nition implicit in the FTC
study. However, neither the market de¯nition nor the nationwide distribution of market size are available to
the public. In any event, the de¯nition of market boundaries (geographical and otherwise) is by no means
subject to general agreement (cf Hausman and Leonard, 1998).
14
In this case, the increase in cost it entirely due to the increase in price. Notice that the value of 16.5%
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taking entry into account, under the alternative assumptions of uniform and Pareto city size
density. In both cases, the actual increase in consumer cost is substantially lower than in
the case of no entry. In other words, entry does play an important role in the evaluation of
the welfare impact of the merger.
The importance of entry is con¯rmed by the values in Rows 4{7, which give the probability
of entry as a result of the merger. Rows 4{5 give the probability that entry will take place
in a given market. The estimates are about 42% under the uniform distribution assumption
and about 16% under the Pareto assumption. These number, however, underestimate the
actual impact of the merger since entry takes place in the markets of relatively larger size. A
more appropriate measure is the probability that, for a randomly selected consumer, entry
will take place in his or her market. These probabilities are presented in Rows 6{7: more
than 50% under the uniform assumption and more than 25% under the Pareto assumption.
In order to get a better idea of how reasonable these results are, I consider additional
implications of the calibration in terms of other variables of interest. First, the markups
implied by the calibration are 17.6%, 6.9%, and 2.8% under monopoly, duopoly and triopoly,
respectively. These values seem a priori reasonable. The frequency ratio between one-store
markets and two-store markets is .256 under the uniform distribution and 5.54 under the
Pareto distribution (the latter was directly calibrated from the city location data). Based
on the results from the FTC study that were made public, one can estimate the same ratio
to be about .5 under the FTC market de¯nition (see Dalkir and Warren-Boulton, 1998).
This value lies between the uniform and Pareto distribution values. This, together with the
fact that the results do not di®er too much between the uniform and Pareto cases, gives
additional con¯dence to the calibration results. Finally, the model implies that it takes a
market 5.8 times bigger to support two ¯rms than it does to support one; and it takes a
market 2.9 times bigger to support three ¯rms than to support two. These ratios are much
greater than the ones estimated by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) for selected businesses in
small U.S. towns. It is not obvious, however, whether the Bresnahan-Reiss estimates would
extend to markets greater than small towns and to businesses with signi¯cantly greater entry
costs, like o±ce supplies superstores.
4 Concluding remarks
I have argued that the possibility of post-merger entry substantially improves the e®ect of
a merger on consumer welfare. I have also shown that post-merger entry drastically shifts
the perspective on cost e±ciencies as a merger defense and asset sales as a remedy. Cost
e±ciencies (in the form of lower marginal cost) decrease the likelihood of entry, and thus
bene¯t consumers less than if entry conditions were exogenously given. Likewise, by selling
is greater than the di®erential between one store and two-store markets, which was calibrated at 10%. The
reason is that the Salop model predicts a monopolist with two stores to price higher than a monopolist with
one store. This is because the latter faces a downward sloping demand, whereas the former faces an inverse
L-shaped demand.
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assets (stores) to potential rivals, merging ¯rms e®ectively \buy them o®," that is, dissuade
them from opening new stores, an e®ect that is detrimental to consumers.
Although my results are primarily of a qualitative nature, I have attempted to show, by
means of numerical calibration, that the e®ects of entry are non-negligible. I should add,
however, that the numerical results are subject to a number of caveats. Commenting on the
supermarket industry, it has been argued that
Typically, it is fairly di±cult for a newcomer to enter a supermarket market
from outside, [as it lacks] the advertising umbrella, supervision, and distribution
facilities to make it a potential competitor (Foer, 1999).
In terms of the model in the previous section, this can be interpreted to imply that the entry
cost k is greater for the potential entrant than for the incumbents. One should also add that,
while the price increase e®ects of a merger are likely to take place almost immediately after
the merger, entry may take longer to materialize. For these reasons, the numerical model
provides an upper bound on the probability of entry.
A second important caveat is the model itself. That is, the calibration results are limited
by the validity of the circular-city approach to modeling spatial competition. The problem
with this model is that it imposes too strong neighborhood e®ects. However, the alternative
| the representative agent logit model | may be criticized for the exact opposite reason,
viz. not allowing for neighborhood e®ects. The distinction matters, for, as Werden and
Froeb's (1998) analysis suggests, the likelihood of post-merger entry is signi¯cantly lower
with a logit demand model.
Reality is somewhere between the two extremes of product di®erentiation, and I would
expect the results also to lie somewhere in between. At a minimum, my results prove the
possibility that post-merger entry changes merger analysis in a substantive way, in particular
the analysis of e±ciency gains as a defense and asset sales as a remedy.
The above caveats also point to a promising route for future research: to set out and
estimate (or calibrate) a more complex, realistic model of product di®erentiation; and, based
on this, to measure consumer welfare in the pre- and post-merger equilibria.
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